Improving HMX's Tokenomics for Long Term Growth

Background & Motivation:
I have rarely participated in governance processes, but I believe it is my duty as part of the community to suggest potential improvements for better outcomes. As a holder of HMX, I’ve been thinking deeply about improving its tokenomics. Recently, HMX holders have faced challenges due to the market conditions and sentiment, leading to a constant price decline.

While the market is to blame for the overall decline in altcoin prices, I believe now is an opportune time to revisit and possibly adjust our tokenomics to benefit all holders.

Last month, the team proposed a potential improvement to HMX tokenomics by suggesting a staking requirement for esHMX vesters, which faced backlash from the community. You can find the discussion thread here. I would like to revisit this discussion and propose a solution that I believe is fair for all parties involved, while putting the HMX community first.

Objective:
To help improve the price action of HMX token through reduction of the sell pressure by users who do not show any platform loyalty (i.e. farmers and dumpers).

Details:
To assess tokenomics to identify the most appropriate course of action, I believe we need to understand the different stakeholders holding HMX/esHMX. In my view, we can categorize holders of esHMX into the following categories based on what they do with their esHMX.

  1. Stake Only: These holders, once they claim their esHMX, proceed to stake their esHMX without vesting. They do not intend to vest esHMX as they potentially do not plan on ever selling, and would like to compound rewards and DP as much as possible, to earn a higher share of protocol revenue over time. In my view, this group of users is the most loyal and long-term oriented, and should be rewarded.

  2. Vest & Stake: These holders, once they claim their esHMX, start vesting their esHMX. Once the esHMX has been vested and converted into HMX, they stake their HMX to start earning protocol fees and more esHMX from emission. They probably choose to vest initially, because they want to to give themselves flexibility to sell their vested tokens if they no longer believe in the project. In my view, this group of users exhibit medium level of loyalty to the platform, as they may have an intention of selling the tokens later.

  3. Vest & Dump: This group of users, once receive their esHMX tokens, choose to vest immediately and then sell the vested tokens into the market to lock in profit and yields. While there is nothing wrong with this approach, I believe it is the most short-sighted group of all and does not exhibit any loyalty to the platform as token holders.

Note: Please note that a user can be a combination of group 2 & 3, which mean they vest and stake some and sell some.

When examining these three categories of users, I believe Dragon Points (DP) can serve as a proxy for platform loyalty.

Assuming all users start with the same amount of esHMX:

  • Group One (Stake Only) will have the highest number of DP because they continuously stake their tokens without vesting.
  • Group Two (Vest & Stake) will have a moderate amount of DP, as they initially vest but continue to stake afterwards.
  • Group Three (Vest & Dump) will have none, as they quickly vest and sell their tokens without staking.

Therefore, DP can be a reliable measure of user loyalty and commitment to the platform.

With that said, I propose that we revisit HMX’s tokenomics adjustment plan with the following changes:

Adjustment #1: Introduce a vesting requirement with DP for current vesting period

This adjustment will require esHMX vesters to have DP staked to start vesting their tokens according to the original 12-month schedule. For example, a possible requirement could be 1 DP for every 4 esHMX (1:4 ratio). This number is arbitrary, and the team can determine the most suitable ratio, but a 1:4 ratio seems reasonable in my opinion.

With this adjustment, users who have been vesting and dumping esHMX on stakers will be most affected (group 3) while users who just stake only (group 1) will remain unaffected. If users in group 1 choose to vest, they should be able to do so, as they should have accrued a certain amount of DP.

With a lenient 1:4 ratio suggested above, I believe this is very fair for all the stakeholders, as DP is emitted at 100% APR, which means users will have stake for only one quarter to have enough DP to vest their staked amount.

Adjustment #2: Lengthen the vesting period for all users vesting HMX to 36 months

While introducing a DP staking requirement, users can still vest their esHMX. However, the vesting schedule will be extended to 24 or 36 months instead of the current 12 months. This allows users to realize their yields/gains, but over a longer period.

The original proposal suggested a staking requirement where users would need to stake HMX to vest esHMX, forcing those who have esHMX but no longer hold HMX to purchase HMX from the market to stake, offering no exit option without additional expenditure.

Increasing the vesting period addresses this issue by allowing users to exit without spending extra funds, though over a longer timeframe.

Implementation Details:
Here are some key implementation details to consider. These are open for discussion, but I am sharing my thoughts:

  • All esHMX in vesting will remain unaffected if the user has enough DP staked to cover the esHMX in vesting based on the suggested ratio (1 DP : 4 esHMX).
  • All esHMX in vesting beyond users’ DP coverage will be unvested. Users will have to vest these tokens again through an extended vesting period of 24 or 36 months.

I believe existing esHMX vesting positions should not be grandfathered, as the vested HMX can already be claimed by the user. Existing positions that have not been vested should follow the new vesting requirement and timeline.

Conclusion:
In summary, I believe these two changes will be crucial in improving HMX’s tokenomics and fostering long-term growth. These adjustments protect the interests of long-term HMX holders from short-term profit seekers while keeping long-term holders unaffected.

They also address the key concerns raised by the community in the previous proposal, as users will no longer need to spend funds to exit their remaining esHMX.

Lastly, as a holder of HMX, I urge our fellow HMX holders to share their thoughts and support. The loudest voices in the community seem to be from those who vest and dump. As long-term holders, we need to show unity and demonstrate that there is a significant group of users who support protecting the long-term interests of HMX.

4 Likes

I fully agree with your ideas. The above plus thicker liquidity via buy backs could be a winning combination.

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I have always thought of dragon points as the true measurement of loyalty to the protocol.

I am all for this.

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Thank you everyone, we must make our voice heard.

Holders have been taken advantage of by these mercenary users. This will be key in ensuring we are protected from such behavior.

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Project spend fortunes attempting to distinguish real/durable users from dumpers. Dragon Points are a built in measurement to do just that.

If anyone has a more elegant solution I’d like to hear it; but I think you nailed it.

Thanks for sharing your proposal, we really appreciate the time and thought you put into it.

I find several aspects of your suggestion quite interesting, especially the idea of using Dragon Points to measure platform loyalty.

Thank you so much for this proposal. I think this is a great proposal, and it should be put to voting asap.

Just one addition. I think if any HMX holders cancel their unstaking (restaking) within 21-day period. They should get their DPs back. Here are the reasons:

  1. other HMX holders and HMX in general will greatly benefit from this, as cancelling unstaking means less HMX that can be sold to the market, and stabilize HMX price during this high market volatility.

  2. some dragons have unstaked some of their HMX, as previously DPs are under utilized. With this proposal, the DPs’ utility is what it should have been all along. So, we should give them the opportunity to get their DPs back. Also, before this proposal there is no solid way to stop the price bleeding, so it’s understandable that people consider unstaking.

  3. It gives the HMX holders to have the incentive to cancel or restake their unstaking. As of now there is really no point for HMX holders to consider restake their unstaking, and they just have to go through with the unstaking. Plus those who are unstaking already be penalized by not receiving the yield and compounding during the unstaking period, thus permanently losing DPs are just double/over penalties.

I hope the community consider this addition.

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Hey @Dragoon, thank you for this interesting addition to the proposal.
Can you please provide more details on these specific points of your proposal? I think it’s important to clarify them and discuss with the community:

  • You suggest a 21-day look-back period during which HMX holders would get their DPs back. We would like to know what motivated you to set this specific time period rather than a different one, and we wish for the community to discuss this proposed period and know if they agree with it.

  • What’s the ratio of DP that will be refunded? Will users recover 100% of their DP, or a certain percentage?

  • If a user cancels their unstaking and recovers their DP, will their unstaking period reset if they decide to unstake again in the future, or will it resume from where it was previously?

Hey @Unlevered89, can you please provide more details on these specific points of your proposal as well? I think these points are also important to clarify and discuss with the community. After that, we will have a clearer proposal that could potentially be put to a vote.

  • The proposal suggests a 1:4 ratio of DP to esHMX for vesting requirements. How was this ratio determined? It would be great to discuss this further with the community to gather their feedback.

  • For users who are currently vesting and don’t meet the DP/esHMX ratio, what will happen to their “unvested” esHMX?

Also, I invite you all to take a look at this proposal. It seems quite interesting, and I think we could potentially merge it with this one or incorporate some of its elements.

@Unlevered89 First of all, thanks for putting together a well though out proposal. I know it takes a lot of time and effort to craft this type of in-depth post. It’s great to see such a strong engagement from a community member.

I personally think this is a great idea and we should move forward to try to finalize all of the parameters and implementation details and put it forward as an HIP for a community to vote on.

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Hey Dragons, before we can submit this proposal to the HIP section, we need to define and agree upon the final values for several key elements in Unlevered89’s proposal and Dragoon’s addition to this proposal. These include:

Unlevered89’s proposal

  1. The 1:4 ratio of DP to esHMX for vesting requirements
  2. The proposed extension of the vesting period to 24 or 36 months
  3. For users who are currently vesting and don’t meet the DP/esHMX ratio, what will happen to their unvested esHMX?

Dragoon’s addition to the proposal

  1. Should we incorporate Dragoon’s addition to the original proposal?
    If yes, we need to define and agree upon:
  2. The 21-day look-back period for HMX holders to get their DPs back
  3. The ratio or percentage of DP that will be refunded (100% or a different percentage)
  4. If a user cancels their unstaking and recovers their DP, will their unstaking period reset if they decide to unstake again in the future, or will it resume from where it was previously?

Please share your thoughts and suggestions on these points so we can finalize the proposal, submit it to the HIP section, and ultimately send it to Snapshot for voting.

Hi @Takamura, thank you for these questions, let me share my thought on these points:

  1. Actually, the 21-day period is linked to the current HMX unstaking period of 21 days. Let me elaborate on this point.

Current Mechanism: DPs are automatically burnt on the date HMX holders “starting” their 21-days unstaking period.

My proposal: DPs will be be burnt only if HMX holders choose to “claim” their unlocked HMX after the 21-day unstaking period. If HMX holders choose to “restake” their HMXs either (i) during their unstaking period or (ii) after unstaking period but has not yet claimed. They will get their DPs back.

  1. The ratio should be 100% of their DP. However, they will be penalized by not getting any yield between the time they start the unstaking and the time they restake.

  2. Their unstaking period will reset if they decide to unstake again in the future as the compensation for getting their DPs back.

Let me know if you have any further questions or comments on the above, more than happy to discuss further.

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Hi @Dragoon, thank you for the clarifications. This seems fine to me, and I believe the community will appreciate this approach. We’ll wait a few more days, then draft a formal proposal to submit in the HIP section before it can be put to a vote.

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Hey Dragons! Following this discussion, we have created HIP-5. We invite you to read it and share your thoughts before this proposal goes to vote.
Read HIP-5 now: [HIP-5] Improving HMX’s Tokenomics for Long Term Growth

@Dragoon: Regarding users reclaiming their DP during unstaking, we’ve currently made it retroactive only as an implementation detail of this proposal. We’re taking a step-by-step approach for better governance. If you wish to reopen the debate, we look forward to further discussing your proposal with the community.